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Introduction 
Pakistan’s trade with the rest of  the world has, from the beginning of  the 
country’s  existence, played  a  crucial  role  in  its  deve1opment.l  It is 
axiomatic that international trade is important for all developing coun- 
tries because they lack capital and intermediate manufactured goods and 
must earn foreign exchange to import them. But in Pakistan the foreign 
trade sector has made an unusually important contribution to economic 
growth, largely because of  the historical circumstances of  the country’s 
creation and the international economic conditions during the early years 
of  its existence. In 1947 Pakistan was created by a partition of  the sub- 
continent into three regions: India, West Pakistan, and East Pakistan. 
The latter two  regions were united  in one national  government until 
1972, when East Pakistan seceded and became Bangladesh. Both East 
and West Pakistan were principally agricultural areas before 1947, and, 
when trade with India was  severed in the wake of  the partition there 
emerged extremely severe shortages of  manufactured goods, previously 
purchased from the manufacturing centers of  Bombay and Calcutta. The 
shock of  such a sudden cessation of  trade and the large latent domestic 
demand for manufactured products launched Pakistan on a program of 
rapid domestic industrialization. 
The international  economic environment in the early  1950s pushed 
Pakistan toward reliance on import substitution as a means of  promot- 
ing domestic industrialization. The collapse of  the Korean War  com- 
modity boom cut Pakistan’s foreign exchange earnings sharply, and the 
government responded by erecting an elaborate exchange control system 
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that  provided  lavish  profits  for  domestic  entrepreneurs  (see Papanek 
1967; Lewis  1969). Import substitution fueled industrial growth until 
the early  1960s, when the strong and steady growth of  world  demand 
for manufactured goods prompted  Pakistan’s planners to raise substan- 
tially the effective exchange rates  (EERs) for exports of  manufactured 
goods. A surge in Pakistan’s manufactured exports gave support to Paki- 
stan’s continued rapid expansion of  the manufacturing sector. Even the 
rapid  growth of  agriculture during the 1960s can be attributed  in part 
to Pakistan’s trade policies. Export taxes on a number of  commodities 
were  reduced,  and  import  restrictions  on fertilizers,  insecticides,  and 
other farm inputs were liberalized. 
Another significant development in Pakistan, as we mentioned above, 
was the secession of  East Pakistan from what was then known as Paki- 
stan in 1972, when West Pakistan became the Pakistan of  today. Since 
then  Pakistan  has  experienced much  political  turmoil,  culminating in 
the military  coup of  1977 that deposed Prime Minister Bhutto. During 
this period  of  political unrest, economic policy was neglected,  and the 
well-established economic administrative structure of  the 1960s deteri- 
orated somewhat. 
The importance  of  Pakistan’s  trade  sector has  been  analyzed  in a 
number  of  studies  (Lewis  1969, 1970; White  1974; Guisinger  1976), 
but the analysis has focused on the relationship of  trade policies to the 
rate of  economic expansion. This focus on growth stems in part from 
the widespread belief  of  economic planners  and theorists alike during 
the 1960s that growth, employment, and equity in the distribution of  in- 
come were complementary, not competitive, social goals. Rapid expan- 
sion of  national income, they believed, would percolate through the eco- 
nomic structure, raising employment in all sectors and redressing income 
inequalities. The rise of  urban unemployment in many developing coun- 
tr?es, coupled with a sharp public outcry in Pakistan over the excessive 
wealth concentrated in the hands of  a few industrialists, led the govern- 
ment to reassess its emphasis on rapid economic growth. Since the early 
1970s the government  has adopted  a number of  antipoverty measures 
that have sought to ensure increased real wages and increased employ- 
ment  opportunities  for the  poorest  segment  of  society.  For  various 
reasons, some of  which were completely beyond  the control of  govern- 
ment-adverse  weather conditions, the oil price increase, and the world 
recession-these  antipoverty measures have had little apparent effect. 
In considering what policies can be used  effectively to raise the level 
of  employment  in  Pakistan,  it is  important to  examine  the following 
questions:  first, What has been the effect in the past of  trade policies 
on both the rate and the structure of  employment? and, second, What 
modifications of  existing trade policies would  expand  employment op- 
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levels of  unemployment and underemployment in the economy? In the 
following two sections we will briefly review the main features of  Paki- 
stan’s economic growth and describe the structure of  foreign trade and 
protection.  We  will  explore  the  contribution  of  export  and  import- 
competing industries to employment by  examining the labor content of 
imports and exports, and subsequent sections will indicate the degree to 
which the labor content of  imports and exports has been influenced by 
distortions in factor markets. 
Two important aspects of  the scope of  this study should be noted at 
the  outset.  First,  the  geographical coverage is  limited  to present-day 
Pakistan or what was, before  1972, West Pakistan. “Pakistan” is used 
to refer both to the geographical region contained within the boundaries 
of  only  present-day Pakistan  and  to the  original boundaries  that  in- 
cluded what is  now Bangladesh. Where some confusion might arise in 
the use of  this simplifying convention, the words “All”  (i.e., West Paki- 
stan  plus  East  Pakistan)  and  “West”  are inserted  in  parentheses to 
clarify which geographical region is being described. While this ambigu- 
ous use of  the word “Pakistan” is far from satisfactory, it is less cumber- 
some than repeated references to “pre-1972” Pakistan and similar terms. 
Second, the  principal benchmark  year  of  analysis for this  study is 
the Pakistani fiscal year 1969/70--that  is, July 1969 to June 1970. The 
selection of  this year was based on several considerations. As we pointed 
out above, the period since 1970 has been extremely tumultuous from 
both  political  and  economic points  of  view.  It would  be  difficult to 
argue that any year during this period was representative or typical. Al- 
though  no  year  is  ever  free  from  random  and  nonrecurring  events, 
1969/70  is perhaps  more nearly typical than  any of  the more recent 
years. Most important,  the most  complete source of  value-added  and 
employment data for this study was the Census of  Manufacturing  Zndus- 
tries, 1969-70. In some cases data on industry are available for 1970/71, 
and these are incorporated in the study where appropriate. Certain data 
series-on  wages and effective export exchange rates, for example-are 
available for more recent years, and these are also included to relate this 
study as closely as possible to current economic issues.2 
7.1  Growth and Structural Change: An Overview 
7.1.1  Growth:  1950-70 
One of  the poorest countries of  the world at the time of  its creation- 
“an economic wreck,” according to a Time magazine story in  1947- 
Pakistan managed to increase its real per capita income over the decade 
of the  1950s by  only  10 percent. But over the  1960s, real per  capita 
income rose  by  50 percent.  During  the latter  decade,  economic per- 294  Stephen Guisinger 
formance was  quite  respectable by  comparison with  countries in  the 
same per capita income bracket  and gave the lie to predictions of  the 
previous decade  that  Pakistan-resource  poor  and  people  rich-was 
caught inextricably in a low-income equilibrium trap. 
Perhaps the most dramatic and unexpected change was in the pace of 
agricultural growth. As table 7.1 shows, the annual rate of  agricultural 
growth in Pakistan averaged 5 percent during the 1960s, a figure thought 
unattainable on a sustained basis by  any developing country, especially 
Pakistan. The movement from virtual stagnation to a 5  percent rate of 
expansion was the result of  two “revolutions” : a tubewell-chemical revo- 
lution in the first half  of  the decade, and the Green Revolution in the 
second half. Technological innovation and adaptation were at the core 
of both  revolutions, but the primary force behind the acceptance and 
spread of  the new technologies was the government’s price policies. In 
contrast to the previous decade, when the internal terms of  trade were 
tilted in favor of  the manufacturing sector, the government permitted 
agricultural prices to rise relative to industrial prices. The commodity- 
fertilizer price ratio became so attractive that use of  chemical fertilizers 
increased, agricultural productivity rose, and the real income of  farmers 
expanded significantly. 
While agriculture stagnated in the 1950s, industry flourished because 
of  the high protection afforded by  the exchange control system and be- 
cause of  the pent-up demand for consumer goods no longer available 
from  traditional  sources. Import  substitution in  cotton  and  synthetic 
textiles, leather goods, soaps, matches, bicycles, and other simple-tech- 
nology consumer goods occurred rapidly during the 1950s. One impor- 
tant factor shaping the pattern  of  industrial growth during this period 
Table 7.1  Sectoral Rates of  Growth, 
1950-70  (Average Annual 
Percentage Rates at Constant 
1959-60 Prices) 
Sector  1950-60  1960-70 
Agriculture  1.7  5.0 
Manufacturing  18.2  9.8 
Other  3.8  7.3 
Total GNP  3.5  6.8 
Population  2.3  2.7 
Per capita GNP  1.2  4.1 
Source:  1950-60,  Papanek (1967, p. 20); 1960-70, 
Government of  Pakistan, Economic Survey 1975- 
76  (1976), App. p.  10. 
Note:  “Manufacturing” excludes small-scale indus- 
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was the availability of  domestic raw materials. Products requiring im- 
ported inputs to any large extent were not prime candidates for import 
substitution in spite of  high protection. Rather, those goods made with 
locally produced raw materials, such as textiles  and leather products, 
grew most rapidly because producers did not have to undergo the costly 
and time-consuming procedure of  attaining import licenses for the prin- 
cipal inputs. The restrictions on imported inputs slowed the growth of 
the investment goods industries because of  the higher import component. 
By  1963 more than three-quarters of  consumer goods were produced at 
home, compared with only one-third of  investment goods. 
The pace of  manufacturing growth slowed in the  1960s. In part this 
was  inevitable because high rates  of  growth  from an extremely small 
base are not difficult, but  it becomes more difficult to maintain these 
rates as the base expands. But several real economic factors did dampen 
the  rate  of  manufacturing expansion. The elimination of  easy  oppor- 
tunities for import replacement caused investors to search outside the 
manufacturing sector for new business ventures. Moreover, rates of  pro- 
tection diminished during the first few years of  the decade, adding to 
investors’ reluctance  to  build  new  manufacturing plants.  The rate of 
growth  in  manufacturing  was  still  extremely  rapid  by  international 
standards-almost  10  percent  per  annum  for  large-  and  small-scale 
units  combined.3 Success  in  maintaining the  momentum  in  industry 
during this period can be traced, to a very great degree, to a de facto 
devaluation of  the export exchange rate brought about by  the introduc- 
tion of  the export bonus voucher scheme. This scheme, described more 
fully  in  a subsequent section, in  effect gave exporters an  opportunity 
to sell their foreign exchange earnings at a very favorable rate. Although 
the  bonus  voucher’s  value  fluctuated,  it  nevertheless  augmented  the 
official exchange rate,  and  Pakistan  avoided to  some extent the trap 
that import substitution set for many developing countries:  a stagnant 
export sector languishing behind a heavily overvalued local currency. 
In summary, the  1960s represented  a  quantum jump  in Pakistan’s 
economic performance as compared with the previous decade. Not all 
of  Pakistan’s success can be attributed to her own policies. The willing- 
ness of donors to supply foreign aid in the first half  of  the 1960s was 
undoubtedly a major factor in the acceleration of  growth. The steady 
growth  of  the world  market  for  labor-intensive, agriculturally based 
products during the decade was, if  not  a necessary condition, a major 
element in the expansion of manufacturing exports. Yet none of  these 
external factors would have had a measurable effect on the overall rate 
of  economic growth if  Pakistan had not undertaken a major reform of 
her economic policies after 1958. These reforms, for the most part, took 
the form of  rationalization and liberalization of  the direct controls of  the 
previous decade. Many distortions remained, but the overall tendency 296  Stephen Guisinger 
was to bring about more, rather than less, uniformity in the degree of 
distortions among sectors and subsectors of  the economy. 
7.1.2 
Since 1947 the pattern of  Pakistan’s trade has changed dramatically. 
Exporting  almost solely  agricultural goods and  minerals in  the early 
1950s, Pakistan rapidly became an exporter of  manufactured goods. Al- 
though these largely involved the first stages of  processing of  agricultural 
goods-converting raw cotton into yam and hides into tanned leather, 
for example-the  rapid rise of  manufactured goods as a share of  total 
exports  is  rather  remarkable  given  Pakistan’s  relatively  low  level  of 
development. In 1969/70, manufactured goods accounted for two-thirds 
of all exports. The structure of  imports has also undergone substantial 
change, but in a different form. The division of  total imports between 
natural resource based goods (agricultural products and minerals)  and 
manufactured  goods has  remained  approximately the  same over two 
decades of  Pakistan’s development (1950-70).  But the composition of 
each of  these two categories has altered. Within the manufactured goods 
group, for example, imports of  consumer goods have been replaced by 
imports of  intermediate and investment goods. The composition of  im- 
ports and exports in  1969/70 is shown in table 7.2, which also shows 
product classification according to its trade orientation (see section 7.3 
for the discussion on the allocation of  trade by commodity category). 
Trade in Natural Resource Based Goods 
Pakistan’s imports of  natural resource based (NRB) goods in  1969/ 
70 consisted basically of  three  products:  wheat, crude oil, and wood. 
Imports of  wheat have varied greatly depending on the availability of 
PL 480 financing and Pakistan’s own agricultural production. By  com- 
parison with imports both before and after  1969/70, wheat imports in 
this  year  were  below  normal.  Pakistan  produces  crude  oil, but  only 
enough to supply about 10 percent of  domestic needs. Pakistan imported 
almost no other minerals in  unprocessed form because of  the lack of 
domestic processing capacity. 
Pakistan’s exports of  NRB goods in  1969/70 consisted primarily of 
raw cotton, rice, fish, hides, and wool. Raw cotton was by far the major 
export product, accounting for more than two-fifths of  all NRB exports. 
Manufactured Goods 
The distribution of both imports and exports of  manufactured goods 
across the three principal product categories-consumer,  intermediate, 
and investment goods-is  shown in table 7.2. Each manufactured com- 
modity is further classified into one of  three categories: export, import- 
competing or noncompeting import. The T statistic described in the in- 
The Structure and Pattern of  Trade Table 7.2  Trade Flows, 1969/70 
Commodity Group 
Value of  Total  Value of  Total  T 
Exports  Exports  Imports  Imports  Statis-  Trade 
(Rs 000s)  (%I  (Rs 000s)  (%)  ticsa  Categoryb 
Manu  factures 
Consumer goods 
Sugar and confectionery 
Tea and coffee 







Wood, cork, and furniture 
Drugs and pharmaceuticals 
Printing and publishing 
Sporting goods 
Total consumer goods 
Intermediate goods 
Paper and paper products 
Leather and leather products 
Rubber and rubber products 
Chemicals 
Petroleum and petroleum products 
Railroad ties 


























































































































NC Table 7.2-continued 
Commodity Group 
Value of  Total  Value of  Total  T 
Exports  Exports  Imports  Imports  Statis-  Trade 




Fabricated metal products 
Nonelectrical machinery 
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troductory chapter  (see section 7.3 for more discussion)  is  shown in 
column 5 of  the table. 
Export industries. More than three-quarters  of  Pakistan’s manufac- 
tured  exports  are concentrated in  just four industries:  cotton textiles, 
leather products, footwear, and sporting goods. The remaining one-quar- 
ter are dispersed fairly evenly over the other industry categories. Two 
of  the four major export industries accounting for more than 60 percent 
of  total manufactured exports-cotton  textiles and leather products- 
rely to a great extent on domestic raw materials and, depending on how 
close that link is, could be classified as processed NRB or as manufac- 
tured exports. The other two leading industries-footwear  and sporting 
goods-appear  to derive their comparative advantage strictly from rela- 
tive factor costs. In both industries, a principal intermediate input-rub- 
ber for footwear production and wood for sporting goods (cricket bats, 
tennis rackets)-is  imported. 
In two  of  the  export  industries, small-scale producers-defined  as 
those with fewer than twenty workers-have  a significant share of  the 
market. Since export data are not compiled separately by size of  firm, the 
actual contribution of  small producers to exports is unknown. Informal 
estimates have been made that as much as half  of  all exports of  gray 
cloth originates in the small-scale sector. It is interesting that since the 
late  1960s the fastest-growing export industries have been dominated 
by  small-scale firrns-carpets, surgical instruments, and sporting goods. 
As will be shown below, the rapid growth of  exports from small-scale 
producers came at a time when the overall employment of  the small- 
scale sector was  declining, suggesting, on  the  one  hand,  a major  re- 
structuring of  this sector as it adapted to changing consumer tastes and 
competition from the large-scale sector but, on the other hand, a strong 
export potential, possibly based on its labor intensity. Little is known 
about the small-scale sector because it falls outside normal data collec- 
tion channels, since small producers are not subject to compulsory reg- 
istration. As a result, the data on factor intensities presented in a subse- 
quent section do not include small-scale producers. 
Zmport-competing industries.  In eleven industries, domestic consump- 
tion is roughly equal to domestic production, and by  the three-way di- 
Notes to Table 7.2 
Source: Government of  Pakistan, Pakistan  Trade Statistics: 1969170. 
aT  statistics are averages of  1969/70 and 1970/71  data. TL  statistics were not cal- 
culated for NRB  goods, since this study focuses upon manufacturing activity only. 
Rice and cotton are exportables, other NRB is an  importable, and wheat and min- 
ing are noncompeting importables. 
bC =  import-competing  industry; X =  export  industry; NC =  noncompeting in- 
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vision introduced earlier they are therefore considered import-competing. 
Not surprisingly, only  10 percent of  all manufactured imports compete 
with  these industries because import substitution in these industries is 
almost complete. Nine  of  the  eleven industries in this category  are in 
the  consumer  goods  sector,  the  remaining  two  being  nonmetallic 
minerals (cement) and scientific instruments. It is somewhat misleading 
to state unequivocally that import substitution possibilities in consumer 
goods have been exhausted, because the level of  aggregation employed 
in this  analysis  masks  a  number  of  remaining  opportunities.  For in- 
stance, consumer durables  (refrigerators, air conditioners, etc.)  are still 
largely imported but are classified in table 7.2 as investment goods. 
Noncompeting industries. Almost  all of  the intermediate and invest- 
ment goods industries fall under the heading “noncompeting.” The only 
exceptions  are one  export  industry-leather  products-and  the  two 
import-competing industries noted above, nonmetallic minerals and sci- 
entific instruments.  The degree of  “noncompetitiveness)’ of  industries 
under this heading  varies  widely. Some,  like basic  metals,  have  since 
become, or will soon become, import-competing because of  investment 
projects  now  nearing  completion.  In other  industries,  such  as motor 
vehicles, scale factors make widespread  import substitution an unlikely 
prospect for the short run because Pakistan’s internal market is too small 
to accommodate plants of  efficient size. 
7.1.3  The Pattern of  Trade 
Perhaps the most important feature of  the origin  and destination of 
Pakistan’s  trade  during  the  late  1960s was  the economic union  with 
what was then East Pakistan. A third of  Pakistan’s exports in  1969/70 
went to East Pakistan, and 15 percent of  her imports originated there. 
The cotton group  (raw  cotton, yarn,  textiles)  and  rice accounted for 
almost half  the exports to the eastern wing, with  the rest  spread  over 
many  different product groups. The principal imports from East Paki- 
stan included tea, jute manufactures, paper, and matches. These together 
accounted for more than half  of  East Pakistan’s exports to Pakistan. 
The actual gains from trade accruing to each of  the two wings of  the 
country are the subject of  considerable controversy.  It is important to 
recognize, however,  that changes  in  trade with  East Pakistan  made a 
relatively small contribution to Pakistan’s industrial growth. It has been 
estimated  that less  than 5 percent  of  the growth of  industrial  output 
could be attributed  to the expansion  of  exports to East Pakistan or to 
the domestic replacement of  imports coming from East Pakistan  (Guis- 
inger  1976). Moreover,  after the severance of  ties with East Pakistan, 
Pakistan had relatively  little difficulty marketing the items abroad that 
were formerly shipped to East Pakistan or finding alternative sources of 301  Trade Policies and Employment: The Case of  Pakistan 
imports.  While  the composition  of  both  exports  and imports  changed 
between the pre-  and postseparation periods, there is no evidence that 
these changes arose because of  the separation itself. 
Insofar as trade with other countries is concerned, by far the bulk of 
imports came from developed  countries. In 1969-70  more than three- 
quarters of  all imports came from Europe (38 percent), North America 
(28 percent), Japan  (10 percent), and Hong Kong  (1 percent). The 
centrally planned economies supplied 8 percent of  imports, and the rest 
was divided among other developing countries. No trade took place with 
India  in  1969/70 because of  a  ban that was in  effect from the early 
1950s until  1976. 
Pakistan’s exports to developed countries amounted to almost half of 
all exports. Exports to North America came to 7 percent, Europe to 24 
percent, and Hong Kong and Japan combined to  18 percent. The cen- 
trally  planned  economies  absorbed  15 percent  of  the export total. In 
comparing import and export shares by region, one should bear in mind 
that imports in 1969/70 were roughly  double the value of  exports, so 
that, for example, the deficit in trade with North America was, in dollar 
terms,  far greater  than  the respective  shares of  imports  and  exports 
would suggest. 
7.1.4  Patterns of  Industrial Growth 
The major  influence on Pakistan’s  pattern  of  trade over the period 
1950-70  was the growth of  large-scale manufacturing. In sheer quan- 
Table 7.3  Annual Rates of Growth of  Manufacturing and Its 
Principal Sectors 
West Pakistan  All Pakistan 
1951/52-  1954/55-  1959/60-  1963/64-  1963/64- 
1954/55  1959/60  1963/64  1970/71  1970171 
(Current  (Current  (Current  (Current  (Constant 
Sector  Prices)  Prices)  Prices)  Prices)  Prices) a 
Large-scale manufacturing 
Consumer goods  43 %  16%  13%  14.5%  11.0% 
Intermediate goods 28  27  14  11.2  5.7 
Investment goods  16  28  26  7.2  1.7 
Total large-scale  38  20  16  12.9  9.0 
Large- and small- 
scale manufacturing, 
total (West Pakistan 
only)  34  12  16  - 
Source: See Guisinger  (1976, table 2). 
UPrices of  1963/64. 302  Stephen Guisinger 
titative terms, import substitution was  successful in eliminating almost 
all consumer goods imports. The rapid  rise of  manufacturing enabled 
Pakistan  to  diversify its export  base  and  to  expand imports of  inter- 
mediate and investment goods. Table 7.3 presents rates  of  growth of 
output for the major commodity groups for four separate time periods. 
The pattern of  growth rates bears out a number of  the familiar fea- 
tures of  Pakistan’s early industrialization. Growth rates for the manu- 
facturing sector fell off  sharply after 1955, remained more or less con- 
stant at a fairly high level between 1955 and 1963, then declined again. 
Sources of  Industrial Growth 
The changes in the nature of  Pakistan’s industrialization can be seen 
from an analysis of  the “sources” of  growth. Growth can be attributed 
to three sources: import substitution, export expansion, and the increase 
in domestic demand. The contributions of  these three sources to manu- 
facturing growth  in  Pakistan  for  four  different subperiods  covering 
roughly the first two decades of  Pakistan’s industrialization are shown 
in table 7.4. 
The pattern of  sources clearly shows the deflection of  manufacturing 
from an almost exclusive strategy of  import substitution toward a more 
even pattern of expansion. Perhaps the most  striking feature of  these 
sources is that import substitution, which was practically the only source 
of  growth in the initial period, accounted for no more than one-quarter 
of  the increases in manufacturing output as a whole and in its main sub- 
sectors in subsequent periods. It is interesting that, even before the intro- 
duction of  the export bonus voucher scheme, exports were an important 
source  of  manufacturing growth, largely  due to the comparative cost 
advantage that jute and cotton textiles had even at a highly overvalued 
exchange rate (see section 7.4). 
Industrial  strucfure. The cumulative effects of  Pakistan’s pattern of 
industrialization can be seen in the data on sector and trade shares con- 
tained in table 7.5. In 1970, consumer goods accounted for four-fifths of 
manufacturing value added. Since Pakistan’s premier manufacturing in- 
dustry-textiles-is  included in this study as part  of  consumer goods, 
it is perhaps not surprising that this sector commands such a high per- 
centage of  total  industrial  output.  The preponderant  position of  con- 
sumer goods has very important implications for the future rate and pat- 
terns of  growth in the manufacturing sector. 
The other interesting pattern  evident in table 7.5 is the differential 
effect that past import substitution has had on the shares of  imports in 
the total supplies of  the three sectors. Import substitution is almost ex- 
hausted in consumer goods, where only 6 percent of  the total supplies of 
these goods is obtained from abroad. In the intermediate and investment Table 7.4  Sources of  Manufacturing Growth: Percentage of Increased Output 
All Pakistan  All Pakistan  West Pakistan  All Pakistan 
1951-54  1954-59  1959-63  1963-70 
Export  Import  Export  Import  Export  Import  Export  Import 
Domestic  Expan-  Substi-  Domestic  Expan-  Substi-  Domestic  Expan-  Substi-  Demand  Expan-  Substi- 
Sector  Demand  sion  tution  Demand  sion  tution  Demand  sion  tution  Domestic  sion  tution 
Consumer goods  3  1  96  56  16  28  110  -1  -9  59  26  15 
Investment goods  -7  1  106  72  a  27  109  1  -10  71  3  26 
All industries  2  2  96  53  24  23  96  5  --1  70  17  13 
Source: Guisinger (1976). 
Intermediate goods  7  5  87  34  58  8  48  22  30  77  23  0 304  Stephen Guisinger 
Table 7.5  Structure of  Manufacturing in Pakistan, 
1970 
Sector 
Share  Share of  Share of 
in  Imports  Exports 
Value  in Total  in Total 
Added  Suppliesa  Suppliesa 
~~  ~~  ~ 
Consumer goods  80%  6%  29 % 
Intermediate goods  7  58  15 
Investment goods  13  63  4 
Source: Guisinger (1976). 
aTotal supply is gross value of  output plus imports. 
goods sectors, imports account for 58 and 63 percent,  respectively, of 
the goods supplied, and thus in a technical sense ample opportunities for 
import substitution remain, though the scope for economically sound im- 
port replacement in these sectors cannot be determined from these data. 
On the export side, the consumer goods sector, led by textiles, has the 
highest export share, 29 percent, with the intermediate goods and invest- 
ment goods sectors substantially below that level with 15 and 4 percent, 
respectively. 
7.1.5  Structure of  Employment 
Pakistan’s concerns with employment are perhaps as pressing as those 
of  any  developing country covered  by  this project.  On the one hand, 
population growth has been very rapid,  averaging 2.8 percent annually 
from 1950 to 1970 and 3 percent from 1970  to 1975. Almost 60percent 
of  the labor force was in agriculture in  1975, and so population pres- 
sures  will  intensify  the  need  to  create  nonagricultural  employment 
opportunities. 
Open unemployment has not been  a major  factor in Pakistan  until 
recently:  real incomes  simply  are too low. However, there have been 
measures that have raised the real wage in the formal sector, and the 
formal/informal  labor market distinction is growing in importance. As 
will be seen in section 7.4, the growing differential is, in part, one of  the 
factors causing total employment in manufacturing to grow very slowly. 
The levels of  open unemployment, in both rural and urban areas, are 
low  compared  with  many  developing  countries.  No  national  survey, 
apart from the 1972 housing, economic, and demographic (HED) sur- 
vey, has  recorded  an unemployment rate greater than  5 percent.  The 
13 percent figure reported in the HED survey is the only exception and 
appears to be due to differences in the definition of  unemployed persons, 
since the 1971/72 and 1974/75 labor force surveys both record unem- 
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may seem paradoxical  in view of  Pakistan’s  extreme poverty  and high 
rate of population growth. Yet the absence of  open unemployment makes 
sense if, as later sections of  this chapter make clear, few barriers exist 
to the movement of  labor among sectors, especially between the formal 
and informal sectors. Underemployment is a far greater problem. Few 
workers replied to survey interviewers that they were unable to find any 
work,  even  though  the work  they  did find often left  them  below the 
poverty  line  (on  the  incidence  of  poverty,  see  Naseem  1973  and 
Guisinger  19773). 
The pattern of  growth during 1950-70  led to changes in the structure 
of  employment, as is evident from table 7.6. Between the two census 
years, 195  1 and 1961, the share of  the labor force engaged in agriculture 
fell while the shares of  manufacturing and the various service industries 
rose. The largest gainer, in absolute terms, was manufacturing, reflecting 
the particularly rapid rate of  expansion of  this sector. 
During 1961-72,  roughly the decade of  the 1960s, the share of  agri- 
cultural  employment  in  total  employment remained  almost the  same, 
implying  a  relatively fast rate of  growth for agricultural  employment. 
There are a number of  possible causes for this, but certainly one impor- 
Table 7.6  Labor Force, Employment, and Distribution of  Employment 
by Industry in (West) Pakistan,  1951-72 
Net Percentage 
Change 
Labor force  1951 
Total (thousands)  9,8  12.0 
Employed (thousands)  9,33  1.0 
Unemployed (% )  3.2 
Not classifiable (To )  .7 
Employment 
distribution (%  ) 
Agriculture  67.5 
Mining  .1 
Manufacturing  10.0 
Electricity, gas, and water 
Construction 
Wholesale and retail trade  7.1 
Transportation  1.8 
Finance  -n 
Services  11.6 
Total  100.0 
















1972  1951-61  1961-72 
~ 
19,016.0  +30.1  +49.0 
16,373.0  +33.6  +31.3 
13.0  -  1.7  +11.5 
.9  +  .1  +  .I 
59.3  -  7.6  -  .6 
1.0  +  .1  +  .8 
8.3  + 4.1  -  5.8 
-  .1 
+ 2.4  4.6 1 +  ” 
9.3’  +  .4  + 2.0 
3.9  + 1.2  +  .9 
.7  -  +  .5 
12.8  + 1.3  -  .1 
-  100.0  - 
Source:  1951, Farooq  (1976)  p.  88; 1961, Farooq  (1976)  p.  56;  1972, Govern- 
ment of  Pakistan (1972), Housing, economic and demographic survey, table 20. 
Note: Includes males and females. 
aIncluded with wholesale and retail trade in 1951 census. 306  Stephen Guisinger 
tant factor was the rapid growth in agricultural output. In spite of  the 
technological changes that occurred in this sector after 1960, the rate of 
expansion was so great that the demand for agricultural labor kept pace 
with the growth of  the labor force. 
The most difficult shift to explain during 1961-72  is  the decline in 
manufacturing’s share of  total employment, from  14.1 percent  to  8.3 
percent. This decline was not only relative; the number of  persons em- 
ployed in manufacturing fell, as can readily be seen from comparing the 
group  share with  total  employment. Errors  or  redefinitions  in  sector 
classification in the census are possible, but the decline is also apparent 
in the data collected through the annual labor force surveys. 
Manufacturing employment in both large-scale and small-scale estab- 
lishments for 1961 and 1972 are shown in table 7.7. Because the data 
on total employment and large-scale employment are derived from two 
different surveys, the  levels of  small-scale employment, calculated  as 
the difference between total and large-scale employment, must be con- 
sidered as only orders of  magnitude. This is particularly true of  employ- 
ment  changes for  a  particular  industry group  but  is  still true  when 
Table 7.7  Manufacturing Employment by Industrial Category, in 
(West) Pakistan, 1961 and 1972 (Thousands of  Workers) 
Industry 
1961  1972 
Total  Total 
Employ-  Large-  Small-  Employ-  Large-  Small- 
ment  Scale  Scale  ment  Scale  Scale 
Food, beverages, and 
tobacco  131  30  101 
.hather  products, textiles, 
and clothing  842  178  664 
Wood products  162  2  160 
Iron and steel products, 
Paper products and printing  22  11  11 
fabricated metal products, 
transportation equipment, 
electrical goods, and non- 
electrical machinery and 
equipment  28 1  64  217 
Nonmetallic mineral products  161  12  149 
Products of  petroleum and 
coal, rubber products, and 
chemical products  25  18  7 
Miscellaneous  82  22  60 
Total  1,706  337  1,369 
Source:  Guisinger (1978). 
99  57  42 
856  254  602 
82  4  78 
29  12  17 
108  82  26 
143  17  126 
40  36  4 
76  18  58 
1,433  480  953 
Note: See text for reservations regarding the data, especially for small-scale estab- 
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aggregate employment of  all industry groups is considered. Nonetheless, 
the overall drop in employment in the small-scale sector is striking and 
probably  too great to be solely the product of  erroneous data. On the 
basis  of  these  data,  employment  in  the  small-scale  sector  declined 
roughly  30 percent  over the eleven-year period. This apparent decline 
runs  counter  to the common assumption  among planners  in Pakistan 
that small-scale sector employment expanded during the 1960s. Indirect 
evidence  on employment  growth in this sector is mixed.  Certainly, in 
some  industries-notably  carpets,  surgical  instruments,  and  sporting 
goods-the  rapid growth in exports must have been accompanied by an 
expansion of  employment.  For the largest of  the small-scale industries, 
cotton  textile weaving, Anwar  (1975)  suggests that  employment  may 
have grown by  as much  as 5 percent over 1961-72.  However, Anwar 
(1975) and Malik (1975) concluded that there are such great ambigui- 
ties  in  the data on textile  production  and use  that  little  can be said 
with  confidence  about the growth  of  either  employment  or output  in 
this  sector. For many  rural small-scale industries, such as pottery  and 
ironworking,  Eckert  (  1972)  found  abundant  indirect  evidence  of  a 
sharp decrease in employment. 
The employment picture in manufacturing is thus somewhat clouded 
by  inadequacies  of  the data.  However,  it  is true that  employment in 
large-scale manufacturing grew over the 1961-72  period  at an annual 
rate of  3.2 percent, while large-scale manufacturing output was increas- 
ing by  more than 10 percent per annum. According to available data, 
this expansion of  large-scale employment was not sufficient to offset the 
decline in small-scale employment, with the result  that total manufac- 
turing employment actually declined over the period. The probable cause 
of  the low expansion of  employment in the large-scale sector is a rela- 
tively  low  output  elasticity  of  employment  (about 0.2).  In  1959/60 
prices,  output grew by  220 percent from 1961 to 1972 while employ- 
ment rose by  just 42 percent. 
7.1.6  Income Distribution 
Pakistan  is unusual  for a developing  country  not  only because  the 
degree  of  income  disparity  is  relatively  low,  but  also  because it has 
shown a tendency to fall rather than rise during a period of  rapid eco- 
nomic growth. The data in table 7.8 show a slight downward trend in 
the Gini coefficient for both the total population  and the rural sector. 
The change in income distribution involved more than a reshuffling of 
income among the upper income brackets, as can be seen from the in- 
creases in the shares of  income received by the bottom 20 aild 40 per- 
centiles shown in columns 3 and 4.  Although the change in income dis- 
tribution between 1963 and 1971 may not be statistically significant, the 
important implication of  these data is that income inequalities did not 
widen. These data, like all similar data on self-reported  income, ought 308  Stephen Guisinger 
Table 7.8  Measures of  Income Distribution Based on  Household 
Income, 1963-72 
Gini  Income Shares 
Coefficient  (Urban +  Rural) 
Year  Total  Rural  Lowest 20%  Lowest 40% 
~  ~~~  ~~ 
1963/64  .347  .339  7.1 
1966/67  .342  .313  8.1 
1968/69  .326  .261  8.5 
1969170  .323  ,292  8.7 
1970/71  .315  .284  8.8 







Source: Naseem  (1973). 
not to be regarded as unfailingly accurate. Yet, when various aspects of 
the income-employment picture are viewed together-the  growth of  em- 
ployment in all ~ectors,~  the rise in real wages reported in a subsequent 
section,  the  slow  rate  of  rural  to  urban  migration-stability  in  the 
measures of  income inequality is at least plausible. 
7.1.7  Inflation 
During the period  covered  by  this  study, inflation was not a major 
issue. Between  1960 and  1970, consumer prices rose 43 percent, or at 
an annually compounded rate of  less than 4 percent. More than half of 
the 43 percent increase occurred between  1964 and 1967, a period that 
included  a major military  confrontation with India and two disastrous 
harvests for lack of  adequate rainfall. After  1970 the rate of  inflation 
soared, and the price level doubled in just five years. Many factors con- 
tributed to the price rise, including the devaluation of  1972, the oil price 
increase and the general increase in the prices of  Pakistan’s imports, do- 
mestic fiscal policy that  perennially  produced  budget deficits,  and the 
adverse weather conditions that drove up the prices of  food grains. 
7.2  The Trade Regime 
Pakistan has undergone three phases in its trade regime history  (for a 
complete discussion,  see  Lewis  1969,  1970 and Papanek  1967). The 
first phase, roughly covering the period  1950-60,  was characterized by 
a very restrictive and pervasive system of  controls to protect import sub- 
stitution  activities.  In the  second  phase  (  1960-72)  these  restrictions 
were liberalized  (although not eliminated), and exports were promoted 
through an export bonus voucher system. The final phase began in May 
1972 when the licensing system was scrapped, tariffs were lowered, and 
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7.2.1  The Trade Regime:  1950-60 
The major instrument  of  protection  to import-substituting  industries 
during the 1950-60  period was the system of  import licensing. The value 
of  import  licenses  issued  and the distribution  of  these  licenses  across 
import categories were determined by  the chief  comptroller of  imports 
and  exports.  Both  the  level  and the product  composition  of  import 
licenses changed from year to year, but in all years demand for imports 
exceeded the controlled supply, creating a gap between importers’ costs 
(c.i.f. prices plus duties and sales taxes)  and market prices. The margin 
above importers’ costs represented  a windfall profit for those fortunate 
enough to have the import licenses. Also, domestic manufacturing firms 
were  able to sell their  products  at prices  well  above importers’ costs 
because of  the scarcity markups  created by restrictive licensing. Tariff 
protection  was,  in  most  product  lines,  a far less  significant factor  in 
overall protection than the licensing of  imports. The structure of  nominal 
and effective tariff  protection, therefore, provides little indication of  the 
production  incentives  created  by  the trade-control  system  during this 
period.  A  study  by  Lewis  (1970, p.  69)  suggests  that  the  scarcity 
markup-the  percentage increase of  the wholesale price above the im- 
porter’s  cost-was  67 percent.  Lewis also found that, for his sample, 
nominal rates of  protection across the three major subcategories of  man- 
ufacturing-consumer,  intermediate,  and  investment  goods-appeared 
to be uniform. 
7.2.2  The Trade Regime:  1960-72 
The reorientation of  economic policy undertaken by the Ayub govern- 
ment after its accession in 1958 had important ramifications on the struc- 
ture of  protection. A new philosophy of  planning and government con- 
trol was enshrined in the second five-year plan (  1960-65). 
The Plan proposes a decisive move towards a more liberal economy 
and a bold switch over from direct controls to a policy of  regulation 
of  the economy through suitable fiscal and monetary controls. 
Direct controls have so far been the chief instrument of  economic 
planning. There  is  a  multiplicity of  such controls on capital  issues, 
prices, profits, imports, exports and distribution of  certain goods and 
commodities. These controls were not only inefficient in many cases; 
they have also placed  an additional burden on the scarce administra- 
tive talent of  the country, which could be better employed on develop- 
ment. . . . Such controls cannot be continued for long without hamper- 
ing private investment and production, reducing capital formation in 
the  economy  and  aggravating  the imbalance  between  demand  and 
supply. [Government of  Pakistan, Second Five-Year Plan, pp. 78-80] 310  Stephen Guisiiger 
The major forms liberalization took  were the export bonus  voucher 
scheme and the introduction  of  liberalized licensing, especially the cre- 
ation of  the “free list,”  though  several other policy  changes were also 
implemented. 
The Export Bonus Voucher Scheme 
During the 1950s it became clear that exporters were caught in a con- 
tinually worsening cost-price squeeze. The maintenance of an overvalued 
exchange rate through restrictive import controls implied (1  ) a constant 
rupee return per dollar of  goods exported; but (2) production costs that 
had  a tendency  to escalate when  foreign exchange became  scarce and 
the scarcity premium on imported raw materials rose. To offset this dis- 
advantage, the export bonus voucher  scheme was introduced  in  1959. 
For every Rs 100 of  foreign exchange earned, the exporter received a 
voucher for either Rs 20 or Rs 40, depending on the type of  product, 
that effectively became a license to import goods up to the face value 
of the voucher. The bonus vouchers were licenses to import only goods 
from a list  of  importable items,  but  the list was  quite broad  and en- 
compassed consumer, intermediate, and investment goods. 
Exporters had considerable freedom in deploying their vouchers. They 
could  be used  to  import  raw  materials  for processing  into export  or 
import-competing goods.  They  could be used  for personal  imports of 
luxury items, such as automobiles. Or they  could be sold on the open 
market,  commanding  a  price  well  in  excess of  their  face  value.  This 
latter  alternative  was  extremely  popular,  and  bonus  vouchers  were 
traded  on the Karachi  stock exchange with  the premium-that  is, the 
price  expressed  as  a  percentage  of  its face  value-quoted  daily.  Im- 
porters  purchasing  the vouchers  could  then  import  any  item  on the 
bonus list. If  the premium was  150 percent and the c.i.f. value of  the 
imported item was $1, or Rs 4.76 at the official rate of  exchange, and 
the duty 50 percent, the total cost to the importer was:  Rs 4.76 +  1.5 
(Rs 4.76) +  0.5 (Rs. 4.76) =  Rs  14.28. Since many items were pur- 
chased with bonus voucher premiums and customs duties of  these same 
levels, it is clear that the marginal EER for exports exceeded the official 
exchange rate by a substantial amount. 
For the exporter, the bonus voucher scheme offered a differentiated 
and variable EER. Agricultural goods carried a bonus rate-the  share 
of foreign exchange earned returned in the form of  vouchers-of  zero 
while manufactured goods carried  rates .of  20 or  40 percent  initially. 
The bonus rate structure, the number of  rate categories,  and the com- 
modities assigned to the various categories were changed from time to 
time. Also, the premium fluctuated between 100 and 200 percent, though 
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cent. The EER for exports ranged, therefore, from Rs 4.76 to Rs 7.61 
(Rs 4.76 + 1.5 x 0.4 x Rs 4.76). 
The Free List 
The introduction of  the free list into Pakistan’s import control system 
represented a major step toward relaxing the direct control mechanism. 
Before January  1964, when the free list was announced, all importers 
had to be registered, and licenses were issued only to certified importers 
up to a limit that was based on the importer’s level of  purchases during 
a base period. The system stood as a barrier to new entrants into import 
trade and, because of  the  compartmentalization of  import quotas,  re- 
sulted in obvious inefficiencies  when some importers had excess demands 
for importable goods while others had an excess supply of  licenses. In 
principle, licenses were  not transferable; in practice they were, but  at 
considerable cost to the integrity of  government civil service. 
The free list essentially enumerated those commodities that could be 
imported without licensing procedures. Because the pent-up demand for 
imports was so enormous, the free list was never truly free (see the com- 
ments on the free list by Thomas, summarized by Lewis 1970, p. 28). 
Nevertheless, the free list represented a step toward the market mech- 
anism. 
After  1964 all imports came into Pakistan under  one of  four cate- 
gories: free list; license; cash-cum-bonus; or bonus. In some cases the 
domestic prices of  importable goods were below the landed cost of  im- 
ports (c.i.f. prices plus duties and taxes) because import substitution had 
proceeded so far that local production was able to satisfy demand, and 
competition  among local  producers  made  tariffs  partially  redundant. 
But for most industrial categories, scarcity margins above landed cost 
were the rule. As in the previous decade, measures of  tariff protection 
did  not  adequately  convey  the  degree or direction of  the  protection 
afforded by the trade control system. 
No major  reforms of  the trade policy system were undertaken  be- 
tween  1964 and  1972, but there were still important modifications in 
various trade control instruments. The export bonus scheme, for exam- 
ple, was altered in several ways. The number of  bonus rate categories- 
two initially-was  raised to six, and commodities were shuffled among 
these categories on several occasions. The list of  products that could be 
imported on bonus was changed from time to time, and other limits were 
placed  on the  amounts of  certain items-automobiles,  for example- 
that could be imported by  any one party under the bonus scheme. The 
free list never played the vital role in the latter half  of  the decade that 
it  did  in  1964  and  1965,  though  it  still performed  a  useful  “safety 312  Stephen Guisinger 
valve”  function  that  released  pressures  inherent  in  any  direct  control 
system. 
Tariff and sales tax rates for some product groups increased over the 
period,  but  because  of  the scarcity  margins  due to the system of  re- 
strictive licensing, this upward movement did not represent a change in 
the structure of  protection. After the 1965 war with India, aid donors’ 
enthusiasm  about  the prospects  for tranquil  economic growth on the 
subcontinent  waned,  and  the  availability  of  foreign  exchange shrank. 
Two poor harvests in 1966 and 1968 aggravated both the general eco- 
nomic picture  and import demand, and interest in liberalization  slack- 
ened. 
7.2.3 
The entire structure of  Pakistan’s  trade-control  system underwent  a 
complete revision at the time of  devaluation in May 1972. The export 
bonus scheme was dropped, tariffs were lowered, and the degree of  cas- 
cading in the tariff  system was reduced. Most important,  the licensing 
system was scrapped,  “An import license would  now  (post-1972)  be 
issued freely to any Pakistani on registration”  (Pakistan Economic Sur- 
vey 1971-72,  p.  16). 
Data  are not  available  to  analyze  completely  the  effects  of  these 
changes. However, the volume of  exports rose from their 1969 level by 
about 40 percent and then leveled off  in the early 1970s. The incentives 
for import substitution, on a net basis, probably did not change radically, 
but more uniformity in protection afforded by the tariff system may have 
been achieved. 
The Trade Regime:  1972 to the Present 
7.2.4 
The trend in protection over the period 1963/64-1970/71  is evident 
from the data in table 7.9. The nominal rates of  protection for a post- 
devaluation  year-l972/73-are  shown  for comparison.  A  cascaded 
structure of  protection can be observed in each of  the three time periods. 
Consumer  goods have a higher  average level of  protection  than either 
intermediate  or investment  goods.  This  is  true  whether  nominal  or 
effective rates6 are taken as the measure of  protection. 
While the structure of  nominal and effective rates of  protection at two 
points in time provides some idea of variations in the level of  incentive 
over  time,  these  measures  fail  to  take  fully  into  account  trends  in 
domestic inflation and, especially for export incentives, trends in prices 
abroad.  Changes in  trade policies  are sometimes needed  to offset  the 
effects of  domestic and foreign  price movements  in  order to maintain 
a  constant  real  incentive;  or,  put  another  way,  the  absence  of  any 
changes in the face of  price movements  at home and abroad may  alter 
the incentive structure and affect domestic production and trade. 
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Guisinger  (1977~)  found that  the  real  EER7 for  exports  actually 
rose between  1968 and  1971, as  the result of  both  changes in trade 
policies and factors in  the international economic environment. While 
no direct comparison with the real incentive for producing import sub- 
Table 7.9  Comparison of  Rates of  Protection, Manufacturing Activities 
1963/64,1970/71,and 1972/73 
Sector 
1963/64  1970/71  1972-73 
Nominal  Effective  Nominal  Effective  Nominal 
Pro-  Pro-  Pro-  Pro-  Pro- 






Printing and publishing 
Soaps 
Motor vehicles 
Simple average  . 
Intermediate goods 



















































































































































Source: Guisinger (1978). 
Note: Nva =  negative value added at international prices; nc =  not calculable be- 
cause of  presence of  negative value-added industries. 314  Stephen Guisinger 
stitutes is possible, it appears that export production became substan- 
tially more attractive than production to  replace imports. Since we will 
observe that exports are labor intensive (section 7.3), trade policies dur- 
ing this period assisted employment growth. 
After 1972, however, the real EER declined, especially since 1974/75. 
The decline was due to inadequate government response to domestic in- 
flation: measures were taken to increase the nominal EERs-the  elimina- 
tion of  certain export taxes-but  these efforts were not sufficient to offset 
the rise in domestic prices. If  the erosion in real EERs continues in- 
definitely, it will plainly hamper employment growth in export manufac- 
turing because of  the labor intensity of  that sector. 
7.3  Labor Content of  Tradable Goods 
7.3.1  Labor Intensity of  Production 
Given the simultaneous emphasis on the processing of  traditional agri- 
cultural goods  and  the rapid  rise of  the intermediate and investment 
goods sectors, it is perhaps not surprising to find highly labor-intensive 
and  capital-intensive  manufacturing activities coexisting in  Pakistan’s 
manufacturing sector. The data on labor per unit of  value added for the 
different branches of  the economy, shown in table 7.10, bear out this 
point. Four different measures  of  labor  intensity  are  included in  the 
table:  labor per  unit  of  value  added for both  direct labor  and direct 
plus  indirect home goods employment; and labor per  unit of  interna- 
tional value added, again for both direct labor and for direct plus indi- 
rect home goods employment. The last column of  table 7.10 shows the 
ratio of  domestic to international value added, which measures the de- 
gree of  protection afforded each activity by the tariff  and trade-control 
system. 
On any  of the four measures, the range in labor intensities among 
industries is extremely broad, especially when the agricultural activities 
are included in  the  comparison. Within manufacturing, there  are five 
industries (sugar, edible oils, cigarettes, fertilizers, and petroleum prod- 
ucts) that require fewer than 40 workers, directly employed in the in- 
dustry, to produce a million rupees of  value added, while eight industries 
(among them cotton textiles) require more than 120 workers to produce 
the same amount of value added. Note that this threefold gap in labor 
intensity is considerably narrowed if  the direct plus indirect home goods 
measure is  used:  the “total” labor coefficients increase by  roughly 50 
percent.8  This change is  due to the sizable indirect home goods used 
in  production and  the fact that home  goods are very labor-intensive. 
Several aspects of  these labor  coefficients deserve mention.  First, the 
direct labor coefficients shown in table 7.10 are industrywide averages Table 7.10  Direct and Total Labor Requirements in Man-Years per Unit of  Domestic or International Value Added, 1969-70 
Industry 
Per Million Rupees of DVA  Per Million Rupees of  NA 
Direct and  Direct and 
Ratio of  Direct  Indirect  Direct  Indirect 
Employment  Employmenta  Employment  Employmenta  DVA to IVA 
NRB 
Rice growing and processing 
Wheat growing and processing 
Cotton growing and ginning 




Cigarettes and tobacco 




Paper and paper products 
Printing and publishing 
Leather and leather products 
Rubber and rubber products 
Fertilizers 
Industrial chemicals 


















































































2.06 Table 7.10-continued 
Industry 
Per Million Rupees of  DVA  Per Million Rupees of IVA 
Direct and  Direct and 
Direct  Indirect  Direct  Indirect  Ratio of 
Employment  Employmenta  Employment  Employmentn  DVA to IVA 
Cement  46 
Basic metals  119 
Metal products  207 
Electrical machinery  101 
Nonelectrical machinery  222 
Motor vehicles  151 
Other transportation equipment  190 
Wood, cork, and furniture  230 
Coal and petroleum products  6 









































Source:  Guisinger (1978). 
aNumber of  persons employed (man-years) per  unit  of  direct plus home goods indirect value added. 317  Trade Policies and Employment: The Case of Pakistan 
of  the  coefficients for subcategories that  show, in  some cases,  an ex- 
tremely high degree of  dispersion. As an indication of  the range of  dis- 
persion among the constituent subcategories of  these industry groups, the 
highest and lowest labor coefficients among the subcategories are shown 
in table 7.11, next to the industry average. The employment contribu- 
tion of  some of  these subcategories is extremely small, but it is impor- 
tant to underscore the fact that shifts in the composition of  employment 
among the subcategories can affect the industry average without a change 
in the factor intensity of  any given activity. 
Second, the labor .intensity of  production varies by size of  firm. Small 
establishments ( 10-50  workers) generally have a higher labor intensity 
than  larger  establishments.  However, the decline  in labor  intensity  is 
not monotonic. In several of  the industry groups, the largest size category 
is  not  the  least  labor-using.  In  some  industries-leather  goods  and 
transportation equipment,  for example-firms  in  the largest  size cate- 
gory  use much more labor per unit  of  value  added than medium-size 
firms. 
7.3.2 
The data on individual requirements can be combined with the trade 
and production data to generate estimates of  the labor embodied in vari- 
ous “bundles” of tradable goods. For Pakistan, a relatively poor country 
with a large, unskilled labor force, one would expect that exports would 
be  more labor-intensive  than  importable goods,  whether  produced  at 
home or imported. One would  also expect that the reverse would hold 
true for the capital and human skills embodied  in tradable goods. Be- 
cause of  data inadequacies, it was not possible to determine the capital 
and skill content, but the data on labor content are consistent with the 
expectations that Pakistan’s exports are labor-intensive. 
The individual activities were allocated to trade categories on the basis 
of  their  Tz statistics.  A  T  value  well  below  zero  indicates  an export 
item; values  near  zero  suggest that  an industry is  principally  import- 
competing; and values well above zero suggest that domestic production 
does not effectively  compete with imports, even though  that condition 
may  eventually  be eliminated  through  subsequent import  substitution. 
With  -0.1  and  0.1  as  cutoff   point^,^  there  are  four  export,  twelve 
import-competing,  and  eleven  noncompeting  industries.  Of  the latter 
group,  however,  only  paper  and  fabricated  metal  products  show  a  T 
value less than 0.5. Paper is a borderline  case  (Ti =  0.22) and is as- 
signed to the noncompeting category, since all its raw  material needs 
(pulp)  are imported.  In the absence of  protection,  it probably would 
not be produced domestically. 
One property  of  these estimates  of  average  labor  content  by  com- 
modity  category  should  be  made  clear  at the  outset.  As  previously 
Labor Contents by Commodity Category Table 7.11  Variation in Direct Labor Requirements within Industry Groups and by Firm Size, 1969/70 (Direct Employment per 
Million Rupees of  Domestic Value Added) 
~ 
Industry 
Range within Group  Size of  Establishment 
Mean  High  LOW  Small  Medium  Large 
Rice growing and processing 
Wheat growing and processing 
Cotton growing and ginning 




Cigarettes and tobacco 




Paper and paper products 
Printing and publishing 
Leather and leather products 
Rubber and rubber products 
Fertilizers 
Industrial chemicals 
















































































- Table 7.11-continued 
Range within Group  Size of Establishment 






Other transportation equipment 
Wood, cork, and furniture 
Miscellaneous  manufacturing 
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discussed, only four industries qualify as “export industries” on the basis 
of the T statistic. It has also been noted that two of  them-cotton  textiles 
and  leather  products-could  be  considered  natural  resource  based 
(NRB) manufacturing industries because of  their reliance on domesti- 
cally produced raw materials. Application of  this criterion  (though per- 
haps unduly restrictive)  would leave only two export industries-foot- 
wear and sporting goods-clearly  marked as Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson 
(HOS). However,  exports  originating in these  two  industries  are less 
than half the value of  HOS exports originating in industries classified as 
importable and non-competing. A serious bias would be introduced if no 
account were taken  of  the labor  embodied in these  “nonexport  indus- 
tries.” Therefore, in the following discussion, estimates of  the labor con- 
tent  of  Pakistan’s  exports  will  refer  to  all  exports  of  manufactures 
excluding, except as  noted, PCB goods. Calculations of  the labor con- 
tent of  Pakistan’s imports will, on the other hand, relate only to those 
classified as importables since, for  purposes  of  this comparison,  there 
is no need to include goods of  which there is no competing production 
in Pakistan. 
Direct Employment per Unit of  Domestic Value Added 
In table 7.12, the average direct labor coefficients for various classifi- 
cations of  imports and exports are shown in column 1. In general, HOS 
exports use 42 percent more labor, on a direct basis, than is  required 
to produce import-competing manufactures. If  NRB manufactured  ex- 
ports are excluded-namely,  cotton  textiles and leather products-the 
margin of  labor intensity falls to 24 percent  (row 2c). This occurs be- 
cause  several  industries  that  exported  in  1969/70  (though  not  con- 
sidered  export  industries by  the  procedures  described  in  the  previous 
section)  are extremely capital-intensive. These are petroleum products, 
sugar, edible oil, and food and beverages. The export of  petroleum  is 
the result  of  the export of  bunker oil that Pakistan  refines but cannot 
absorb in its own market. 
With regard to the direction of  trade, manufactured exports exclusive 
of  processed NRB goods to  developed countries  are 29 percent  more 
labor-intensive than HOS imports from these countries. For trade with 
developing countries, the reverse is  true, probably  because Pakistan  is 
relatively more industrialized than  its LDC trading partners. However, 
note that imports from developing countries form a small part  of  total 
imports (about 2 percent). 
Consequently, they have little effect upon the average labor intensity 
of  all importables. It may also be noted that, if  HOS exports were limited 
to the two export industries that fall unequivocally into this category- 
namely, footwear and sporting goods-the  average labor content of  ex- 
ports to developing countries would be 160 instead of  88 as reported in Table 7.12  Labor Content of  Pakistan’s Trade in HOS MaauEackwes by Majer Trade Flows, 1969/78 (Number of  Workers per 
MiHh  Rupees a€  Vahe Added) 
~~ 
Direct Plus Indirect  Trade Flow as 
Direct  Employment  Percentage of 
Employment  Pakistan’s Total 
per Unit 
of  DVAa  of  DVAa  of  IVAa  Imports 
Exports or  Per unit  Per unit 
1.  Trade with all countries 
a.  Exports, including PCB goodsb 
b.  Exports, excluding PCB goodsb 
c.  Importsc 
d.  la +- Ic 
e.  lb t  lc 
a. Exports, excluding PBC goodsh 
b.  Importsc 
c.  2a + 2b 
a.  Exports, excluding PCB goodsb 
b.  Importsc 
c.  3a t  3b 
2.  Trade with developed countries 























310  65.8 
258  24.3 
202  21.7 
1.53 
1.28 
255  10.1 
186  19.3 
1.37 
260  14.2 
3  64  2.4 
.7  1 
Note:  Trade values have been used as weights in obtaining average coefficients. Small-scale producers are not included in the estimates. 
aDVA =  domestic value added; IVA =  international value  added. 
bPCB =  primary commodity based  (see text). 
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table 7.12. But, since these two industries account for less than a quarter 
of all HOS goods exported to developing countries, the omission of  the 
other, more capital-intensive exporting industries would give a mislead- 
ing estimate of  the true factor content of  Pakistan’s export trade. 
Direct Plus Indirect Home Goods Employment 
None of  the findings on relative labor intensity of  the various combi- 
nations of  imports and exports discussed in the previous section are re- 
versed  when  the employment generated indirectly in  the home goods 
industries is  added to  the  direct  employment. In fact, the  margin in 
labor-use between  imports  and  exports excluding PCB goods widens 
when the direct plus  indirect effects are considered. A comparison of 
columns 1 and 2 of  table 7.12 shows that adding indirect home goods 
employment raises the labor content of  manufactured exports slightly 
more  when  PCB  goods  are  excluded  than  when  they  are  included. 
Since there  are no important  differences in  labor utilization  ratios  in 
home goods industries, this suggests that the traditional processing in- 
dustries, cotton textiles and leather, do not require home goods inputs 
in as great a quantity as the other industries. 
It is interesting that consumer goods exports are more labor-intensive 
(146 workers per unit of  DVA) than intermediate goods (94 workers), 
though only slightly more labor-intensive than investment goods exports 
(129 workers). One implication of  these data is that, for any given level 
of  exports, the higher the share of  intermediate and investment goods, 
the lower the average labor coefficients for all exports. Although some 
investment goods are produced with labor-using techniques, it will be 
seen below that investment goods industries are afforded high absolute 
levels of  protection  (though not  as high  as consumer goods)  and the 
labor intensity may  be a result of  inefficient overmanning instead of  ef- 
ficient use of  relatively cheap manpower. 
Labor Content at International Prices 
The principal effect of  recalculating the labor content coefficients at 
international prices  is  to  roughly  double  the  labor  coefficients while 
leaving their relative position unchanged. When value added at interna- 
tional prices is used as the denominator of  the labor coefficients, exports 
remain between 25 and 50 percent more labor-using than imports. This 
result suggests that exportables and importables are subject to roughly 
the same level of  protection in commodity markets. 
7.3.3  Summary 
Labor requirements in Pakistan’s manufacturing sector vary consider- 
ably between and within activities. However, it is generally true that ex- 
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Consequently, we can conclude that the trade policies followed during 
the 1960s, namely promoting export activities while simultaneously pro- 
tecting import substitutes, did not lead to as much employment growth 
as  other  more  export-leaning policies  might have done.  That overall 
employment fell in manufacturing in the  1960s (though not in large- 
scale manufacturing) probably is due partially to these policies. 
7.4  Factor Market Distortions and the Labor Content of  Trade 
Distortions in factor prices can affect employment levels in a variety 
of ways. The most obvious of  these is through shifts in relative factor 
prices that  alter the  capital/labor  ratios in production.  In developing 
countries,  factor  price  distortions  such  as  minimum  wage  legislation 
have  often pushed  the  market  wage  above  its equilibrium level and 
lowered the market price of  capital to some investors via subsidized in- 
terest on loans to industrial investors, tax holidays, and accelerated de- 
preciation. Distortions not only alter relative prices but are also sympto- 
matic of  blockages in the free flow of  capital and labor among sectors. 
It is important then to identify distortions in the markets for both labor 
and  capital. This is a particularly difficult exercise, since the data on 
wages and rentals are fragmented and not very reliable. 
7.4.1 
In the early  1960s, Pakistan was still widely regarded as the arche- 
typical labor surplus economy. Employment growth in agriculture dur- 
ing the previous decade failed to keep pace with population growth. The 
fastest growing employer, large-scale manufacturing, was still too small 
to make more than a small contribution to solving the growing unem- 
ployment problem. It  is fair to say that  the common expectation for 
the wages of  unskilled workers in all sectors of  the economy was con- 
tinued  stagnation at  near-subsistence levels, and  even  deterioration in 
real terms if  population growth could not be curtailed. 
Wages in Large-Scale Manufacturing 
Wage data for production workers in  the large-scale manufacturing 
sector shown in  table  7.13 provide a rather  clear  indication that the 
expectation of  stagnant real wages has not  been realized. Real wages 
have fluctuated over the period  1960-75,  but a definite upward trend 
can be observed.1° 
Three distinct periods can be discerned in the series on real wages 
(col. 5). In the first period  (1955-63),  real wages conform to the pre- 
diction of  the labor surplus model as they remain more or less constant. 
In the second period (1964-67),  real wages break out of  their stagnant 
trend, first rising, then falling back in the wake of  the inflation following 
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Table 7.13  Money and Real Wages of  Production Workers in Large-Scde 
























Current  Living 
Rupees  Indexb  Indexb 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
981  90  87 
896  82  85 
994  91  93 
1,045  96  96 
1,091  100  100 
1,135  104  1  04 
1,156  106  108 
1,189  109  107 
1,195  110  110 
1,340  123  114 
1,464  134  117 
1,510  138  127 
1,536  141  137 
1,735  159  138 
1,93  1  177  143 
2,094  192  151 
2,389  219  159 
2,914  267  174 
4,012  368  226 
4,953  454  286 
Real Wages 
1959 
Rupees  Indexb 
(4)  (5) 
1,122  103 
1,058  97 
1,059  97 
1,094  100 
1,091  100 
1,09  1  100 
1,070  98 
1,110  102 
1,088  100 
1,180  108 
1,245  114 
1,189  109 
1,257  115 
1,351  124 
1,384  127 
1,504  138 
1,679  143 
1,775  163 
1,730  159 
1,116  1  02 
Source:  Guisinger  (1978, table 4-1). 
aMoney wages from 1970/71 onward are not directly available and, reversing the 
usual  sequence,  have  been  derived  from the  real  wage  series by  application  of 
the cost of  living index. 
b1959/60 =  100. 
the  1965 war with India. Finally, in  the third period  (1968-75),  real 
wages show a definite break  with the past,  rising  steadily  (except  for 
1974/75)  and gaining more than 50 percent by the end of  the period. 
The take-off of  real wages can be traced to various factors. Part of  the 
increase is  due to the changing skill composition  of  employment.  The 
wage data shown in table 7.13  are for production workers, a broad cate- 
gory that includes both skilled and unskilled workers. During the 1960s 
production  in  the  large-scale  manufacturing  sector  shifted  from  the 
simple processing of  consumer goods to more sophisticated and tech- 
nically complex production  of  intermediate and capital goods. Since it 
is likely that the average skill required of  manufacturing workers rose, 
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the average wage in manufacturing without any changes in the real wages 
of each skill category. 
Another part of  the increase is the result of  shifts in the supply and 
demand  for industrial  labor. As  described  below,  there  is  some evi- 
dence that the wages of  hired  agricultural workers rose during this pe- 
riod,  and, since unskilled  workers are fairly  mobile between  industrial 
and  agricultural  labor markets,  the increase in  agricultural wages put 
upward  pressure  on urban  wages.  The supply  schedule  of  industrial 
workers may  also  have been  affected  by  the  emigration  of  unskilled 
and  semiskilled  labor  to the Middle  East.  On the demand  side,  em- 
ployers may have increased wages to reduce labor turnover as a way of 
improving profit margins that began to narrow with the liberalization of 
trade controls in the early 1960s. 
However, the major part of  the increase in real wages occurred  in 
the 1970s and appears to be due to nonmarket factors, particularly the 
wage  policies  introduced  during the period.  Trade unions,  the other 
major nonmarket influence on wages in developing countries, had little 
direct effect on wage levels in Pakistan because of  the constraints placed 
on their activity by legislation adopted in the late 1950s. The first gov- 
ernment intervention in wage determination was, however, not intended. 
It was  in  1963 when  the government revised  its  own pay  scales,  and 
this pay increase spilled over into the private sector. The decline in real 
wages  after  1965 provoked  considerable  labor unrest,  which  in turn 
contributed to the change in government in 1968. The new government 
was committed to improving labor conditions and instituted a number 
of  reforms  in labor policy. The government  issued an Industrial  Rela- 
tions  Ordinance in  1969, the objective  of  which was  to  improve the 
standards of  living of  workers. This included a new minimum wage that 
was rigorously enforced. The effects of  the minimum wage on the aver- 
age wage  of  all production  workers can be seen in table 7.13 by  the 
26  percent  increase in  money wages between  1967/68 and  1969/70. 
Money wages continued to rise through the early 1970s as the coverage 
and enforcement of  the minimum wage legislation was extended. 
The change  in  government  in  1971 produced  a  new  set  of  labor 
policies that boosted industrial wages still further. Reforms in February 
1972 extended workers’ participation in management, made compulsory 
the payment  of  annual  bonuses  at  stipulated  rates,  and  set  minimum 
standards  for  education,  life  insurance,  and  separation  and  medical 
benefits. Workers’ entitlement to a  share in profits was doubled  from 
2.5 to 5 percent. These fringe benefits, coupled with the residual effects 
of  the 1969 minimum wage legislation, added more than 22 percent to 
the earnings of  workers. 
In August 1973 the government adopted the Employee Cost of  Living 
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the public sector to award cost of  living adjustments at a rate fixed by 
government. There have been three such adjustments under the 1973 
ordinance:  Rs 35 monthly in August  1973; Rs 50 in June 1974; and 
Rs  25 in  April  1975.  Thus,  a worker  in  an industrial  area outside 
Karachi, earning the statutory minimum wage of  Rs 125 in June 1973, 
was earning Rs 235 by June 1975-an  increase of  88 percent  in two 
years.  Since consumer prices rose by  approximately 65 percent during 
the same period, real wages of  the workers at the low end of  the pay 
scale  rose  substantially. .The wage  of  the  average worker  rose  by  a 
smaller percentage than the increase in the minimum wage, but it too 
showed an increase in real terms, as can be seen in column 5 of  table 
7.13. 
In summary, over the period 1960-75 real wages in large-scale manu- 
facturing rose  by  almost  60  percent.  In just  seven  of  those  years- 
1967/68 to 1974/75-real  wages rose by 55 percent, or by 6.5 percent 
per  annum.  Few  developing  countries  have  experienced  more  rapid 
increases in real wages for that length of  time. 
An analysis of  wage dispersion in the large-scale manufacturing sector 
by Guisinger and Irfan (1975) did not reveal any widespread differences 
in average earnings per worker among industries. In fact, when account 
was taken of  market influences on interindustry wage differences-the 
skill  mix,  for  example-the  residual  differences  that  could  then  be 
termed  “interindustry”  distortions  were  almost  insignificant compared 
with the wage dispersion observed in other developing countries. How- 
ever, there was a growing tendency for nonmarket factors to widen wage 
differences  among industries.  Nonmarket  factors included trade union 
influence and the share of  the industry controlled by foreign investors. 
The implication of  these findings is that, though interindustry wage dis- 
tortions were not a serious problem in 1969/70, evidence was mounting 
that serious distortions could emerge in the future. 
Public Sector Wages 
Government workers,  together with workers in the large-scale manu- 
facturing  sector,  constitute  the bulk  of  formal-sector  employment  in 
Pakistan. Not counting defense personnel, who are excluded from the 
labor force statistics, workers in central, provincial,  and local govern- 
ment positions  account for approximately  6 percent of  the total labor 
force, of which one-third are teachers and educational administrators. 
The most  interesting feature of  government  wages  over  the period 
1960-75  was  the  decline  in  real  wages  for workers  in  each  of  the 
twenty-two  grade  levels. Moreover,  since the real  wages  of  the most 
highly skilled workers declined faster than those of  the least skilled, skill 
differentials narrowed. The decline in public sector wages, particularly at 
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private sector wages that was a legacy of  the country’s colonial history. 
The degree to which public sector wage scales influence private sector 
wage  scales is unknown, but  there is  circumstantial  evidence  that  the 
two are related  (Guisinger, Henderson, and Scully 1978). Public policy 
in this area has thus had  the effect of  moderating skill differentials in 
both the private and the public components of  the formal labor market 
as well as between these two sectors. 
Urban Informal Sector Wages 
While workers  in large-scale  manufacturing  and government consti- 
tute more than half  the formal sector employment in urban  areas, the 
vast  majority  of  urban  workers  are employed  in  the informal  sector. 
Wages in the informal sector  are determined by  forces of  supply and 
demand and do not come under the direct influence of  trade unions or 
labor legislation. 
Wage data for informal sector workers are only infrequently reported 
in  censuses and surveys,  and when reported they  are often difficult to 
interpret. The informal sector is far more heterogeneous than the formal 
sector in terms of  the age, education,  and occupation of  workers.  The 
average wage of  all workers in the informal sector has little meaning, 
since the characteristics of  the workers may be changing over time. Also, 
many  informal  sector workers-such  as  hawkers  and peddlers-work 
for profit rather than wages, and their reported  earnings frequently in- 
clude an implicit return to the capital that they use in their work. 
While the available evidence on wage trends  in the urban  informal 
sector is clearly preliminary, there is no basis for concluding that the gap 
between formal and informal sector wages widened between  1960 and 
1975. Data compiled by Guisinger (1978) suggest that the real wages of 
some  of  the least-skilled  informal  sector  occupations  experienced  an 
increase over this period. Moreover, regression analysis of  the determi- 
nants of  personal earnings, taking into  account such factors as  educa- 
tion, age, and other socioeconomic characteristics, showed that includ- 
ing a dummy variable for informal sector workers did not add signifi- 
cantly to the explanation of  interpersonal earnings differentials. 
Agricultural Wages 
The real wages of  both permanent and casual agricultural workers did 
not increase during 1960-66,  but between  1966 and 1973 real wages of 
these workers increased by  more than 2 percent per  annum  (see Gui- 
singer  1978 for details). Moreover, the low rates of  rural-to-urban  mi- 
gration  reported  by  Eckert  (1972)  tend  to  confirm  the  strong  labor 
demand implied by rising real wages. Fewer than one hundred thousand 
workers a year  moved  from rural to urban  areas, a surprisingly  small 
figure for a total labor force of  more than twenty million. 328  Stephen Guisinger 
7.4.2  The Price of  Capital and Relative Factor Costs 
The Price of  Capital, 1960-75 
The price of  capital in Pakistan,  as in most developing countries, is 
shaped as much by the investment and trade policies of  the government 
as by  market  forces.  Throughout  Pakistan’s  development,  capital  has 
been  regarded  as  the essential  ingredient  in  the growth  process,  and 
therefore it has been carefully controlled  to be channeled into priority 
areas. Large-scale manufacturing, a priority sector in Pakistan’s past de- 
velopment plans, has always been the beneficiary of  various forms of in- 
vestment  incentives,  including:  subsidized  interest  rates;  accelerated 
depreciation  allowances;  tax  holidays;  and,  perhaps  most  important, 
licenses for the import of  capital goods, whose scarcity value was several 
times their face value. These and other less direct incentives have com- 
bined  to  reduce the  actual  (market) price  of  capital below its oppor- 
tunity  cost-the  price  that  would  have  prevailed  if  a  neutral  set  of 
government policies had been in effect and if  all markets had functioned 
smoothly. 
To  understand  the  full  effect  of  Pakistan’s  investment  incentive 
measures,  it  is essential to know  the degree  of  subsidy  implicit in the 
package of  incentive policies and how it has varied over time. The price 
of  capital  is,  unfortunately,  an elusive concept  both  theoretically  and 
practically:  theoretically  because  no single  measure  fully  reflects  the 
complete general equilibrium ramifications of  investment incentive poli- 
cies; practically because data are available from official sources on only 
a few of  the elements that make up the price of  capital. Moreover, dur- 
ing the 1960s access of  a firm to the various investment incentives  of- 
fered by government depended on its size, its geographic location, and 
the economic sector in  which  it  operated.  It is unlikely  that any two 
investments  received  the same package of  incentives. Without  detailed 
data on investment  incentives disaggregated by industry, firm size, and 
geographic location,  an average price  of  capital cannot be determined. 
In what follows we  shall nevertheless  attempt  to estimate the price 
of  capital, taking into consideration all factors that may have influenced 
its deviation from the opportunity cost. 
The appropriate partial  equilibrium  concept for measuring the price 
of  capital is the annual rental value of  a unit of  capital, also referred to 
as the user cost of  capital. Just as a firm rents labor services it does not 
own, the rental value of  capital is the amount the firm would be charged 
by  a competitive  asset-leasing  firm  to rent  the use  of  capital for one 
year. Even though most firms own the majority of  their assets, the hypo- 
thetical rental cost is the relevant price of  capital to be compared with 
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It can be shown that, under certain specific conditions described be- 
low, the rental cost of  capital, Pk, is:ll 
where : 
dt is the economic rate of  depreciation in year t; 
drt  is the depreciation allowance in year t permitted by the 
tax laws; 
f is the exchange rate of  local currency per unit of  foreign 
exchange; 
his the number  of  years for which complete exemption 
from  corporate  taxes  is  granted  under  a  tax holiday 
scheme; 
i is the discount factor; 
k,  is the foreign exchange price of  the capital asset; 
m is the tariff on capital goods; 
n  is the economic life of  the asset; 
Pk  is the annual rental value of  capital; 
ris the annual interest  rate on the financial capital  re- 
quired to purchase the capital asset; 
I 
;  and  1  = 2 
tZs (1 +  iIt 
u is the rate of  corporate profits tax. 
The conditions under which this equation is valid  are the following. 
First, the value of  the asset is restored at the end of  each year to its orig- 
inal cost by  an investment equal to the economic depreciation incurred 
during the year. In other words, the asset remains  intact  and its book 
value does not diminish.  Therefore rental  costs remain  constant,  since 
the value of  the asset is not affected by depreciation. The second condi- 
tion implicit  in this  expression  is that  the asset  is financed completely 
by  equity, whose costs to the firm are not deductible from income for 
tax purposes. If  the asset is leveraged and interest is deductible, then a 
more complex formula is required to incorporate the tax advantages of 
interest deductions. In the extreme case of  a totally leveraged asset (100 
percent financed by debt), no profits would exist in a competitive leas- 
ing  industry,  since  tax  deductible  costs-interest  plus  depreciation- 
would equal income.12 Finally, it is assumed that the corporate income 
tax liability is passed on in the form of  a higher rental cost rather than 
absorbed by the suppliers of  equity capital. This is a reasonable assump- 330  Stephen Guisinger 
tion  given  the observed  mobility  of  financial  capital  among  various 
branches of  the economy. 
From equation  (1  ) it is evident that the price of  capital is influenced 
by  three types  of  factors.  The first category  of  factors  comprises  the 
terms  in the numerator  outside  the brackets-the  cost  of  the capital 
asset (L),  the exchange rate  (f), and the tariff on capital goods (m). 
These three variables determine the domestic price of  the capital asset. 
The higher  any of  these factors are, the higher will be, all other things 
being equal, the rental cost of  capital. The second category consists of 
the factors within the brackets-r,  d, u, and d’. These establish the an- 
nual costs  of  owning capital  assets.  The higher  the  costs  of  financing 
(r)  and the higher the economic depreciation  (d)  ,  the greater the an- 
nual cost. On the other hand,  if  accelerated  depreciation is permitted, 
the larger the permissible rate  (d’) and the tax savings represented by 
the rate of corporate tax  (u), the lower  is the annual cost of  owning 
capital assets. The final category includes the factors in the denominator. 
The higher the rate of  taxation, the higher the rental cost. But the longer 
the tax holiday period  (h),  the Eower  will be the rental cost. The term 
u(Snh+  l/Snl)  represents  the effective  tax  rate  incorporating  the  dis- 
counted benefits from the tax holiday scheme. 
This concept can be used to measure the divergence between the mar- 
ket  and equilibrium  (shadow) prices of  capital. Table 7.14 shows the 
Table 7.14  Annual Rental Value of a $21 Machine under Various 
Incentive Policies: Pakistan, 19591  60 
User Cost  Incremental Reduction 
Policy Type  (Rs)  in User Cost (%  ) 
Case A 




-  Neutral policiesa  58 
Subsidized exchange rate- 
case A and imports at official 
rather than equilibrium rate 
of exchange (f =  4.76 instead 
of Rs 7.6)  36  38 
Subsidized financial cost of 
capital-case  B with r = 
5.74%  instead of  15%.  20  44 
Accelerated depreciation- 
case C with half the original 
Tax holiday-case  D and 
no income tax liability for 
first eight years.  14  12.5 
cost written off  in three years  16  20 
aEquilibrium  financial  cost of  capital  (r  =  15%);  tax and economic rates of  de- 
preciation  equal  (d =  d’ =  0.063); corporate tax rate applied  to all investments 
without  tax  holiday  privileges  (u =  50%); and  capital  equipment  imported  at 
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estimated incremental effects on the price of  capital of  the four major 
investment incentives prevailing in Pakistan in fiscal year 1960. Case A 
represents the equilibrium price of  capital for a machine with an original 
c.i.f. cost of  $21 or Rs 100 ($21 at 4.76 Rs/$).  Case B represents the 
situation where an overvalued exchange rate constitutes the only source 
of implicit subsidy. For example, if  investors are permitted to import 
machinery at the official exchange rate of  Rs. 4.76 instead of  the esti- 
mated  equilibrium exchange rate  for  1959/60  of  Rs  7.6, the  rental 
value of  capital will be Rs 36. Case C shows what happens if, in addi- 
tion to purchasing capital at an overvalued exchange rate, investors ob- 
tain funds at less than the true opportunity cost of  financial capital. Un- 
der these conditions, investors would be able to use the $21 machine for 
an average implicit rental of  only Rs 20. Accelerated depreciation (case 
D) and an eight-year tax holiday (case E) would reduce the rental cost 
still further by  4 and  2 rupees, respectively. The  12.5 percent incre- 
mental reduction in the cost of  capital owing to the tax holiday itself has 
little practical  significance because, unlike the  effects of  the other in- 
centive policies, the tax holiday and accelerated depreciation incentives 
are almost mutually  exclusive substitutes--the  benefits of  accelerated 
depreciation are not  felt during a tax holiday, so that the major part 
simply replaces accelerated depreciation. The tax holiday  reduces the 
price of  capital from 20 to  14, while accelerated depreciation reduces 
it from 20 to 16. 
The comparison of  case A  (neutral policies)  with case E  (all four 
incentives operating) is striking. The market rental cost of  capital is only 
one-fourth the equilibrium cost of  capital; or, viewed from the opposite 
perspective, eliminating all  incentive  policies  would  raise  the  cost  of 
capital 300 percent! The example, however, exaggerates the effect of  in- 
centives in several important ways. First, all firms are leveraged to some 
extent,  and interest  is  deductible from income for tax  purposes; thus 
the tax holiday and accelerated depreciation policies would have a less 
significant influence. Second, it has been assumed that government poli- 
cies can effect a reduction in the cost of  equity analogous to the way 
government can subsidize the costs of  debt to firms by rationing credit at 
artificially low interest rates. Finally, the neutral case assumes a 50 per- 
cent corporate tax burden. If  all incentive policies were stripped away, 
such a high corporate tax rate might not be necessary. One can always 
question whether the appropriate benchmark for comparison is a set of 
policies with  some form  of  taxation,  such as  a corporate  tax, but no 
incentive policies, or a completely distortionless environment-the  clas- 
sic laissez-faire paradigm. 
For these reasons, the rental cost calculations in table 7.14 are only 
illustrative. Nevertheless, the percentage reductions in the rental cost of 
capital gave an indication of  the quantitative effect of  investment incen- 332  Stephen Guisinger 
tive policies on the cost of  capital, and  there can be little doubt that 
those policies provided a significant incentive to adopt capital-intensive 
techniques of  production. 
Trends in the Rental Cost of  Capital: 1960-75 
During 1960-75,  important changes occurred in both the (controlled) 
market  and  the equilibrium rental  values  of  capital. The government 
altered the tax holiday scheme on two occasions, changed the lending 
rate on bank credit to industry, and varied the tariff  levied on capital 
goods. Both the market and the equilibrium cost of  capital were affected 
by  changes in the c.i.f. price index for machinery. Values for the vari- 
ables in equation (1) have been computed for 1960-75,  and market and 
equilibrium rental values have been calculated for each year as if  a new 
investment were being made in that year. Changes in incentive policies 
would, of  course, affect the rental cost on existing capital assets, but the 
time series in table 7.15 show only the rental cost of  new investments. 
From the two time series of  rental costs of  capital it is clear that, until 
the devaluation of  1972, the distortion in the price of  capital remained 
considerable:  the  equilibrium rental  cost  was  never  less  than  three 
Table 7.15  Rental Cost of Capital, 1959/60  to 1974/75 
Equilibrium 
(Shadow)  Ratio of Equilibrium 
Market Prices*  Prices  Rental to 
(Rupees)  (Rupees)  Market Rental (%  ) 

































































aMarket cost of  capital is the annual rental cost  in  rupees €or a machine costing 
$21 (Rs 100) in 1959/60. Since not all firms had access to tax holidays, only cases 
A and D in  table 7.14 are compared in this table. 333  Trade Policies and Employment: The Case of  Pakistan 
times the market rental cost. With devaluation the overvaluation of  the 
rupee was largely eliminated and the tax holiday scheme abandoned. The 
gap between market and equilibrium rental costs closed dramatically. 
The Rental Cost of Capital for  Large and Small Firms 
The rental cost formula also offers insight into the differential cost of 
capital between small and large firms. In the early 1960s, few small-scale 
manufacturing firms in Pakistan had access to import licenses, and when 
they  purchased  foreign  equipment  it  was  through  import agents  who 
appropriated  the scarcity  value  of  the import licenses for themselves. 
Even when  small firms purchased  machinery  made locally, the prices 
generally reflected the full scarcity margins and tariff  duties of  the im- 
ported intermediate inputs used in their production. The prices paid by 
small investors for capital equipment were thus approximately those of 
the equilibrium situation. Small entrepreneurs also lacked access to bank 
credit, and the interest rates on the funds they borrowed in the informal 
market were substantially above the rates paid by  individuals investing 
in large-scale projects in the same industry, and not dissimilar from the 
opportunity  cost of  capital. On the other hand, small-scale firms were 
usually unincorporated and thus exempt from the corporate income tax. 
On these assumptions, the user cost of  a $21 machine for a small manu- 
facturing  establishment in  1959/60  would  have been  of  the order of 
Rs  35.  Its trend  over  time would  have  been  very  similar  to  that of 
the equilibrium cost of  capital. Thus, until  1972 small investors faced 
capital  costs  more  than twice  those  of  their  large-scale  competitors. 
This, coupled with the fact that wages are lower for workers in small- 
scale firms than in large-scale  firms, provided  a very  strong economic 
rationale  for the  observed  tendency  for small-scale  firms  to be  more 
labor-using than comparable large-scale firms. 
Relative Factor Prices: Market and Equilibrium 
Factor proportion decisions by investors are not made on the basis of 
either the price of  capital or the price of  labor alone, but rather on their 
ratio.  The central  issue  in  exploring the employment  effect  of  move- 
ments in both price series is thus the trend in relative factor prices.  In 
table 7.16, column 3, the ratio of  relative factor prices in market terms 
has been computed, Between  1959/60  and  1970/71, the wagehental 
ratio fluctuated between 50 and 70 with no clear trend in either direc- 
tion.  However,  between  1970/71  and  1972/73 the ratio  dropped  by 
more than 50 percent  as  a result  of  the steep increase in the price of 
capital following the 1972 devaluation that largely eliminated the over- 
valuation of  the rupee. After 1972/73, the declining trend was reversed 
and the relative price of  labor rose more than 30 percent. Table 7.16  Factor Prices (in Rupees) and Factor Price Ratios, 1959/60-1974175 
Market Prices  Equilibrium Prices 
Distortion 
Ratio  Ratio  Indicator 
Wages  Capital  (1) + (2)  Wages  Capital  (4) + (5)  (3) + (6) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
1959/60  1,09  1  16  68.2 
1960/61  1,135  17  66.8 
1961  /62  1,156  21  55.0 
1962/63  1,189  22  54.0 
1963/64  1,195  22  54.3 
1964/65  1,340  19  70.5 
1965/66  1,464  24  61.0 
1966/67  1,510  29  52.1 
1967/68  1,536  30  51.2 
1968/69  1,735  34  51.0 
687  58  11.8  5.8 
709  55  12.9  5.2 
720  69  10.4  5.3 
742  88  8.4  6.4 
764  85  9.0  6.0 
786  81  9.7  7.3 
796  73  10.9  5.6 
818  126  6.5  8.0 
840  100  8.4  6.1 
873  109  8.0  6.4 
1969/70  1,93  1  32  60.3  97 1  95  10.2  5.9 
1970/71  2,094  30  69.8  1,047  118  8.9  7.8 
1971  /72  2,389  38  62.9  1,200  140  8.6  7.3 
1972/73  2,914  86  33.9  1,462  109  13.4  2.5 
1973/74  4,O 12  93  43.1  2,007  118  17.0  2.5 
1974/75  4,953  108  45.9  2,477  137  18.0  2.5 
Sources: Col. 1, table 7.13; cols. 2 and 5, table 7.15; col. 4, implied equilibrium wages from Guisinger (1978, table 4-12). 335  Trade Policies and Employment: The Case of  Pakistan 
It is interesting to compare changes in the wage/rental  ratio at market 
prices with  changes in the ratio at equilibrium prices, the latter being 
shown in column 6 of  table 7.16. Apart from a few exceptional years, 
the equilibrium factor price ratio did not behave very differently from 
the market factor price ratio until  1971/72.  Then, however, while the 
market factor price ratio declined with devaluation, the equilibrium ratio 
rose  and continued to rise until  1974/75 because of  the continued in- 
flation in the world prices of  machinery. 
To show the degree of  distortion, a “distortion indicator” has been 
constructed  expressing the market factor price ratio in each year  as a 
percentage of  the equilibrium factor price ratio. Thus, if  the market price 
of  labor were fifty times the market price of  capital, but the equilibrium 
price of  labor were only ten times the equilibrium cost of  capital, the 
distortion  would  be fivefold. This represents  a  “distortion gap”  owing 
to an excess in the market price of  labor over the equilibrium price or 
a subsidy  to the market  price  of  capital  or both.  If  these distortions 
were  eliminated, the distortion  measure in this example indicates that 
the relative cost of  using labor would fall by four-fifths. 
The distortion  series for the period  1959/60 to  1974/75 is shown 
in column 7 of  table 7.16. Although the distortion gap fluctuated dur- 
ing the  1960s, the most dramatic change occurred  after the  1972 de- 
valuation,  with  the gap  narrowing  by  almost  two-thirds  in  one year. 
There is nevertheless  still  a  considerable degree of  absolute distortion 
favoring the use of  capital. 
Perhaps the most striking feature of  the factor price trends shown in 
table 7.16 is the size of the gap that persisted until the 1972 devaluation. 
The  wagelrental  ratio  at market  prices  was  roughly  five  times  the 
equilibrium ratio. No comparable data exist for other developing coun- 
tries with which to contrast the magnitude or effects of  Pakistan’s factor 
market distortion. A measure of  the significance of  this distortion, how- 
ever, can be obtained by estimating the effects that changes in the factor 
price ratio would have had on employment in the large-scale manufac- 
turing sector. 
One study has estimated that a 25 percent reduction in relative factor 
prices of  labor and capital in Ghana would have increased total employ- 
ment  in manufacturing by  20 percent more than would otherwise have 
occurred over a decade during which the industrial sector expanded at 
an annual rate of  10 percent  (Roemer 1972). This study was limited 
to the case where changes in factor prices affected factor proportions in 
new investments only, leaving unchanged the factor proportions associ- 
ated with  the initial stock  of  fixed  assets.  The employment effects of 
factor price  changes  were  examined  under several  assumptions  about 
the elasticity of  substitution between capital and labor and labor’s initial 
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A similar estimate can be made for Pakistan’s large-scale manufactur- 
ing sector. The elasticity of  substitution and labor’s share are assumed 
equal to 1.0 and 0.25, respectively, while the growth rate of  manufac- 
turing output is taken  as 10 percent. If  the factor price ratio remains 
constant  and  no technological  change  occurs,  employment would  of 
course  grow  at  10 percent  per  annum.  If,  however,  the wage/rental 
ratio had been reduced by 50 percent and maintained over the eleven- 
year period  ending in  1970/71,  employment  would  have grown  at an 
annual rate of  13.8 percent. Thus it is possible that instead of  a large- 
scale  manufacturing  labor  force of  500,000 in  1970/71,  this  sector 
might  have  employed  as many as  700,000 workers if  the factor price 
ratio had been reduced as indicated. That 200,000 additional jobs might 
result  from  a  50 percent  decline in the wage/rental  ratio may be an 
underestimate for at least three reasons. First, in the large-scale sector, 
some alteration of  factor proportions in the existing capital stock is pos- 
sible with  a  change in  the factor price  ratio,  particularly  when it  de- 
clines by as much as 50 percent. Capital/labor  ratios in materials han- 
dling processes  are extremely  sensitive to factor price ratios,  and new 
jobs  would  probably  have  emerged  in  existing plants  if  factor prices 
had  been  less  distorted.  Second, increasing  the cost of  capital  in  the 
large-scale  sector  would  have  made  small-scale  establishments more 
cost-competitive and expanded employment growth in this sector. This 
would  have  lowered  the  rate  of  output  expansion  in the  large-scale 
sector, causing employment to grow at something less than 13.8 percent 
per year.  But the expansion of  the  small-scale  sector, which  employs 
twice as many workers as the large-scale sector, might have more than 
made up for this shortfall. It is not known in what degree firms in the 
large- and small-scale sectors are competitors, but it is clear that in some 
of  the  important  small-scale  industrial  categories-particularly  food 
processing  and textiles-the  two manufacturing sectors are more com- 
petitive  than complementary.  Finally,  in  this  exercise,  output  is  held 
constant.  Changes in factor prices would  also change patterns  of  do- 
mestic demand, perhaps making exports grow faster once they were more 
competitive. 
7.5  Summary and,  Conclusions 
In many  ways Pakistan’s  pattern of  trade is singularly  conventional 
and consistent with what one would expect from its factor endowment. 
More labor is employed to produce a unit of  value added in export in- 
dustries than is employed to produce the same amount of  value added 
in industries that compete with  imports.  This holds  true whether only 
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plus indirect employment is used. When labor intensities are calculated 
on  the basis  of  units of  international  value  added,  the same pattern 
holds. The only aspect of  trade patterns where exports do not appear to 
be more labor-intensive  than importable goods is in the regional direc- 
tion.  Imports of  goods from developing countries show  a higher  labor 
intensity than Pakistan’s exports of  similar goods to these countries. This 
result is not unexpected, given that Pakistan’s level of  industrial develop- 
ment is probably greater than that of  its LDC trading partners. 
Distortions in the prices of  commodities introduced by the trade con- 
trol system obviously did not distort trade patterns to the point of  cre- 
ating perverse reversals  in labor content.  Trade policies did, however, 
help shape the structure and growth of  employment. Initially, Pakistan 
relied  on high  protection  to promote import-substituting industrializa- 
tion. But at a relatively early stage in the import substitution program, 
incentives  for  the  export  of  manufactured  goods  were  adopted  that 
served to counteract  the disincentive of  a highly overvalued local cur- 
rency.  Moreover,  the  structure of  protection  gave  a  greater  incentive 
to produce consumer goods than to produce either intermediate or in- 
vestment goods. Since the last two industries are more capital-intensive, 
the  unevenness  in  protection  levels  did  favor  the  more  labor-using 
industries. 
The ability  of  trade  policies  to affect  employment  in  industry  has 
weakened  since 1970. Opportunities for efficient import substitution in 
the most labor-using industries have  almost been  exhausted,  and con- 
tinued  tariff  protection  will  have little  effect  on employment.  Further 
import  substitution,  particularly  in  the  intermediate  and  investment 
goods industries, will not generate nearly as much labor per unit of  value 
added as investments in consumer goods industries did during the 1960s. 
The most serious detriment  to employment  growth in recent  years has 
been the deterioration  of  the real EER for manufactured  exports. Un- 
less the real incentives for exporters of  manufactured goods are allowed 
to  rise,  the large employment potential  of  these industries will not be 
realized. 
Distortions in factor prices have historically favored the use of  capital 
and provided a penalty on the use of  labor. The fact that employment 
grew  in  large-scale  manufacturing  despite  these  strong  disincentives 
should  not  be  construed  as  evidence  that  distorted  factor  prices  are 
meaningless. Very important structural changes in the economy occurred 
during  the  1960s, particularly  the  remarkable  growth  of  agriculture, 
and the employment  effects of  these  structural changes  overcame the 
negative effect on employment of  factor market distortions. If  the same 
strong demand for agricultural labor  could  be expected  in  the  1970s 
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to distortions in factor prices. But from 1970 to 1975 agriculture grew 
at only a 2 percent annual rate. Perhaps most important, mechanization 
of agriculture has continued at a rapid pace. 
The greatest distortion in the price of  capital was eliminated with the 
devaluation of  the rupee in 1972. The major danger to the structure of 
relative factor prices now comes from the acceleration in wage increases. 
Between  1968 and  1975, real market wages increased at more than  5 
percent per annum, and money wages increased at a much higher rate. 
There seems to be little economic justification, on the basis of  allocative 
efficiency, for a continued 5 percent rise per annum in real wages. 
If  Pakistan manages to bring the increase of  wages under control and 
to restore adequate incentives for manufactured exports, their expansion 
could contribute significantly to the growth of  employment opportunities 
in Pakistan. 
Notes 
1.  The  reader  interested  in  a  general  survey  of  economic  development  in 
Pakistan  is  referred to Papanek  (1967) and Lewis  (1970). 
2.  The underlying data used  for this study may be found in Guisinger  (1978), 
available  for  the  cost  of  reproduction  from  the National  Bureau  of  Economic 
Research. 
3.  Small-scale  industry  includes  all  manufacturing units  with  fewer  than  ten 
workers  if power  is used and twenty workers  if  power is not used. 
4. This is  with  the  exception  of  manufacturing employment  during  1961-72. 
Growth of  employment  in all sectors combined  can be easily inferred  from table 
7.6. 
5. Only  the  last  subperiod  sources  relate  to  West  Pakistan,  but  all-Pakistan 
data provide  fairly good approximation  of trends in West Pakistan. 
6. The  effective  rates  of  protection  are  based  upon  price  comparisons  and 
thus incorporate  the premium on import licenses. 
7. This  is the PPP-PLD-EER of  chapter  1. 
8.  For the definition of  home goods, see chapter  1. 
9. The relatively low cutoff point for the noncompeting imports is primarily due 
to the level of  aggregation. 
10.  Throughout, “wages” and “earnings” are used  interchangeably  to designate 
the total compensation of  workers, including-where  data exist-the  imputed value 
of noncash benefits such as food and lodging. 
11. For a derivation of  this specific formula see Guisinger  (1978) and, for the 
general case, Shafa  (1978). 
12.  The  simplifying  assumption  made  in  all  such  analyses  is  that  the  returns 
to management and risk-taking are zero. 339  Trade Policies and Employment: The Case of  Pakistan 
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